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I. INTRODUCTION
A global increase in corporate insolvencies1 has drawn
attention to bankruptcy laws. Various economic factors, as well as
individual circumstances, are responsible for the upsurge in
business failures. High profile bankruptcy cases and the general
increase in bankruptcy filings in the United Kingdom,' as well as
in the United States,3 raise concerns about the effectiveness of
reorganization schemes. The key features of U.K. reorganization
are the "administration order" and "voluntary arrangement"
procedures. In response to the economic climate, the United
Kingdom, in 1985, incorporated a reorganization component into
its insolvency law.
The American practitioner may use Chapter 11' as a model
1. Christina Morton, Insolvency: On the Up and Up, Solving the Insoluble, INT'L FIN.
L. REV. 3, 3 (Spec. Supp. 1990). There has been an increase in corporate failures in the
developed nations. Id.
2. In general, the United Kingdom experienced an increase in its bankruptcy filing
rate during the 1980s; in 1990, the bankruptcy filing rate was three times the 1980 rate.
Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Lawrence A. Weiss, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11: A Review
of the Evidence, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 131, 138 n.24 (1993). In England, the director of
policy for the British Chambers of Commerce expects that the trend in corporate
insolvencies will continue for some time. Jonathan Potts, Insolvencies in the Fourth
Quarter 1992, 8 TOLLEY'S INSOLVENCY L. & PRAC. 144, 144 (1993).
3. The United States has experienced a significant jump in the bankruptcy filing rates
of businesses. During the late 1970s, 8000 firms per year filed for Chapter 11; this rate
increased to 24,000 firms in 1991. Gregory E. Maggs, Bankruptcy As a Business Tool, 71
TEx. L. REV. 681, 681-82 (1993) (reviewing KEVIN J. DELANEY, STRATEGIC BANKRUPT-
cy: How CORPORATIONS AND CREDITORS USE CHAPTER 11 TO THEIR ADVANTAGE
(1992)).
4. Chapter 11 is codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1988 & Supp. V 1993);
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended
at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
This Comment will discuss Chapter 11 as utilized by the business debtor, although
Chapter 11 is available for non-business debtors as well. DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL.,
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
for understanding U.K. reorganization. This approach is useful
because the main U.K. reorganization scheme, the administration
order procedure, is analogous to Chapter 11. An analysis of
Chapter l's flaws illuminates the current and future weaknesses
of- U.K. reorganization schemes. The United States has had
considerable experience with the implementation of "corporate
rescues"; in contrast, the United Kingdom adopted its reorganiza-
tion schemes in the 1980s.
In analyzing reorganization schemes, this Comment assumes
that bankruptcy law is a beneficial "collective system.",5 Part II of
this Comment explores some of the policies and goals underlying
the insolvency laws 6 of the United Kingdom and the United
States. Part III examines Chapter 11, highlighting some of its
perceived flaws. Finally, Part IV examines the "administration
order" and "voluntary arrangement" procedures that are available
under the U.K. Insolvency Act of 1986 ("Insolvency Act").7 Part
IV also examines the effectiveness of management procedures used
during reorganization and the suitability of reorganization schemes
for small firms.
This Comment reveals that while Chapter 11 influenced U.K.
reorganization law, U.K. and U.S. reorganization systems create
significantly different incentives. In sum, the Insolvency Act does
not provide enough incentives to induce debtors to seek reorgani-
zation or to seek it early enough.
II. POLICIES AND GOALS OF THE U.K. AND U.S. INSOLVENCY
SYSTEMS
A. Development of the Insolvency Act
U.K. reorganization law reflects the recognition that Chapter
11 is a valuable scheme for dealing with corporate insolvencies.
The recent Insolvency Act has adopted several features of the U.S.
BANKRUPTCY 734 n.2 (1993).
5. THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMaTs OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 19 (1986).
Bankruptcy law becomes relevant when the rights of numerous creditors must be resolved.
See id. at 209. See infra text accompanying notes 53-56.
6. In the United Kingdom, the term "insolvency" applies to companies, while the
term "bankruptcy" applies to individuals and partnerships.
7. Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45 (Eng.). The Insolvency Act of 1986 incorporated
parts of the Insolvency Act of 1985. For a discussion about the statutes that govern
corporate insolvencies, see infra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
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bankruptcy system.8 Furthermore, many commentators have used
U.S. bankruptcy legislation as a "yardstick" for analyzing other
bankruptcy systems.9
Both U.K. and U.S. insolvency legislative schemes share a
common origin; yet, the two systems have diverged in several
significant ways.10 Prior to the enactment of the Insolvency Act,
U.K. insolvency law did not contain a reorganization component.
Instead, insolvent businesses had only the option of liquidating.
"English law thus fell behind other jurisdictions in the lack of a
formal procedure for reorganization and reconstruction."" By
enacting the Insolvency Act, the United Kingdom has been able
to approximate procedures analogous to Chapter 11.12 Accord-
ingly, a few commentators have stated that the U.K. and U.S.
systems use different approaches to achieve similar goals. 3
The large number of corporate and individual insolvencies was
a motivating factor behind U.K. insolvency law reform. 4 As a
result of these insolvencies, the Secretary of State for Trade
directed the formation of a Review Committee, to be headed by
Sir Kenneth Cork. 5 In 1982, the Review Committee proposed
legislative changes geared towards "fundamental reform of
insolvency law.' 6 The focus of the Review Committee was the
following:
(1) to review the law and practice relating to insolvency,
bankruptcy, liquidation and receiverships in England and
8. Nicholas A. Aminoff, The Development of American and English Bankruptcy
Legislation-From a Common Source to a Shared Goal, 10 STATUTE L. REV. 124, 130-34
(1989).
9. Id. at 133 n.60.
10. Id. at 124. Both U.K. and U.S. insolvency laws, as well as other European
bankruptcy laws, stem from the laws of ancient Rome. See DENNIS CAMPBELL,
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW 3 (1992). The United States modeled
its first bankruptcy statute on U.K. insolvency laws. Aminoff, supra note 8, at 124.
11. Hamish Anderson, Corporate Insolvency After the Insolvency Act 1986, 20
BRACTON L.J. 49, 58 (1988).
12. See generally Aminoff, supra note 8 (discussing how recent "English corporate
insolvency [law] ... has openly borrowed from its American cousin").
13. Philip Carrington & Bennett Murphy, Reconciling UK Administration and US
Chapter 11, 11 INT'L FIN. L. REV. 20, 22-23 (1992).
14. IAN F. FLETCHER, THE LAW OF INSOLVENCY 12 (1990).
15. Id. at 13.
16. Id. at 15. In 1982, the Review Committee presented its report to Parliament.
INSOLVENCY LAW AND PRACTICE, REPORT OF THE REVIEW COMMITTEE, 1982, CMND
8558, at iii [hereinafter INSOLVENCY LAW AND PRACTICE REPORT].
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Wales and to consider what reforms are necessary or
desirable;
(2) to examine the possibility of formulating a comprehen-
sive insolvency system and the extent to which existing
procedures might, with advantage, be harmonised and
integrated;
(3) to suggest possible less formal procedures as alternatives
to bankruptcy and company winding up proceedings in
appropriate circumstances; and
(4) to make recommendations. 7
In 1984, a later publication-A Revised Framework for Insolvency
Law, also known as the Government White Paper-incorporated
many of the proposals of the Review Committee. 8 The Govern-
ment White Paper provided substantial guidance for the Insolvency
Act of 1985,19 which was subsequently incorporated into the
current Insolvency Act.' °
B. General Policies Shared by U.K. and U.S. Bankruptcy
Systems
1. Facilitating a Credit-Based Economy
During its early stages, U.K. insolvency law did not advance
the policy of credit and trade facilitation. The U.K. insolvency
system was originally concerned with "punitive ends and numerous
stigma-bearing disqualifications for adjudged bankrupts."
2'
Accordingly, a penal code traditionally accompanied bankruptcy
laws.22 Modern U.K. bankruptcy law now embodies a more
compassionate attitude toward "unfortunate debtors."'23
17. INSOLVENCY LAW AND PRACTICE REPORT, supra note 16, at iii.
18. A REVISED FRAMEWORK FOR INSOLVENCY LAW, 1984, CMND 9175, at 5
[hereinafter REVISED FRAMEWORK]. The Review Committee on Insolvency Law and
Practice has completed the most in-depth analysis of insolvency in the history of U.K.
insolvency law. ROBERT R. PENNINGTON, PENNINGTON'S CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW
2 (1991).
19. See Insolvency Act, 1985, ch. 65 (Eng.) (consolidated and repealed by Insolvency
Act, 1986, ch. 45 (Eng.)); PENNINGTON, supra note 18, at 2. See generally REVISED
FRAMEWORK, supra note 18.
20. PENNINGTON, supra note 18, at 1; see infra note 107 (describing how the Company
Directors Disqualification Act of 1986 incorporated parts of the Insolvency Act of 1985).
21. Aminoff, supra note 8, at 124.
22. Id. at 131.
23. Id. at 130.
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The United Kingdom enacted the current Insolvency Act
against a backdrop of criticism of the government for its failure to
encourage commercial and economic development.24  The
economic environment in England, particularly the high inflation
and the slowdown of the previous "economic boom," has persuad-
ed the United Kingdom to reform its insolvency laws.2 Thus, the
focus of current U.K. insolvency law is on promoting investment,
trade, and entrepreneurship.26 ' The Insolvency Act, however, has
not become as debtor-oriented as the U.S. Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978 ("Bankruptcy Code").'
Because "[b]ankruptcy law is a response to credit,"'  bank-
ruptcy systems should aim to "facilitate credit in commercial
transactions."29 An economic system based on strict cash transac-
tions would hinder economic development and entrepreneur-
ship.3" Systems based on credit must have a mechanism to
promote an efficient and predictable way to account for the flow
of credit. An insolvency system allows creditors to plan according-
ly because the system provides creditors with the ability to predict
the consequences of a bankruptcy.31 Hence, in support of the
credit facilitation policy, both the United States and the United
Kingdom have formulated insolvency laws that provide statutory
frameworks for debtor-creditor relations.32
24. Id. at 129.
25. FLETCHER, supra note 14, at 12; see also Morton, supra note 1, at 3-4.
26. INSOLVENCY LAW AND PRACTICE REPORT, supra note 16, at 9-13. "In England,
as elsewhere, changes in society and in the commercial life of the community since the
Nineteenth Century require the law of insolvency to be reviewed and refashioned to meet
the needs of our own time." Id. at 9.
27. Hugo Groves, Insolvency for the General Practitioner: Pt 3, 89 LAW SOC'Y'S
GAZETTE 17, 19 (1992). The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was enacted as what is
known as the Bankruptcy Code. See supra note 4.
28. JACKSON, supra note 5, at 7.
29. Evan D. Flaschen & Timothy B. DeSieno, The Development of Insolvency Law
as Part of the Transition from a Centrally Planned to a Market Economy, 26 INT'L LAW.
667, 668 (1992).
30. FLETCHER, supra note 14, at 2-3.
31. Flaschen & DeSieno, supra note 29, at 668-69.
32. See JACKSON, supra note 5, at 7 (discussing the role of credit in the United States).
The premise behind credit economies is that there are individuals and commercial entities
that continually need to borrow money. Id. See also INSOLVENCY LAW AND PRACTICE
REPORT, supra note 16, at 9-13 (discussing the role of credit in the United Kingdom).
In the United States, Congress. enacted the Federal Bankruptcy Statute in 1898,
hoping that bankruptcy law would be a vehicle to facilitate trade and commerce. Aminoff,
supra note 8, at 124. The early American bankruptcy statutes were slanted towards
protecting creditors. Now, the Bankruptcy Code is equally, if not more interested in the
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2. Encouraging Reorganization
Both the United Kingdom and the United States recognize the
premise behind reorganization: a company as a going concern
produces more value than if it is liquidated.33 Congress intended
Chapter 11 to help financially troubled corporations to reorganize,
rather than undergo liquidation. 4 By avoiding liquidation, busi-
nesses can maintain their cash flow to continue their operations,
which produces more value for unsecured creditors.35  This cash
flow also allows businesses to maintain their employees and to
continue receiving supplies.' Thus, the desired result of reorga-
nization is to maximize the assets available to creditors and,
thereby, minimize the loss to society.37 In addition, some theo-
rists assert that bankruptcy law is necessary because creditors are
unable to formulate mutually acceptable plans on their own
without court supervision.38
In the United Kingdom, the Review Committee39 acknowl-
edged the wastefulness and the drawbacks of "winding up, '  and
rehabilitation and the protection of debtors. Id. at 124-25. Bankruptcy law was used as
a tool to "smooth[] the rough edges of an imperfect" economic system. Id. at 124.
33. For a discussion of the premise behind U.S. Chapter 11 reorganization, see H.R.
REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179.
"The premise of a business reorganization is that assets that are used for production in the
industry for which they were designed are more valuable than those same assets sold for
scrap.... It is more economically efficient to reorganize than to liquidate, because it
preserves jobs and assets." Id.
For a discussion about the goals behind the U.K. administration order procedure, see
PENNINGTON, supra note 18, at 300; see also Carrington & Murphy, supra note 13, at 22
(stating that the "preservation of going-concern values" is the main objective behind U.K.
administration and Chapter 11); see also In re Harris Simons Construction Ltd., [1989] 1
W.L.R. 369, 369 (Ch. 1988). "If no administration is made, the company cannot carry on
trading.... The company will have to go into liquidation more or less immediately." Id.
34. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 33, at 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6179.
35. ROBERT L. JORDAN & WILLIAM D. WARREN, BANKRUPTCY 655-56 (3d ed. 1993).
Secured creditors can also potentially benefit, despite their "secured status."
36. Id. at 656.
37. Steve Hill, Company Voluntary Arrangements, 6 INSOLVENCY L. & PRAC. 47, 47
(1990) (discussing the role of U.K. insolvency law).
38. David A. Skeel, Jr., Markets, Courts, and the Brave New World of Bankruptcy
Theory, 1993 WiS. L. REV. 465, 470.
39. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
40. In the United Kingdom, liquidation is most commonly called "winding up," but
the two terms are interchangeable. 2 PALMER'S COMPANY LAW para. 15.004 (25th ed.
1992).
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encouraged "corporate rescues."4 There is a fairly widespread
belief that only the receiver benefits from a "winding up," to the
detriment of creditors. 42 Additional abuses existed where "rogue
liquidators" and corporate directors funneled corporate assets into
a new corporate entity, while old debts and other liabilities
remained with the prior insolvent entities. 43 Hence, the new
insolvency legislation responded to the need to prevent abuses
while encouraging reorganization.
The British Parliament enacted the Insolvency Act to provide
a legal framework for "corporate rescues."'  The administration
order and voluntary arrangement procedures of the Insolvency Act
seek to aid companies in financial distress and to help them avoid
liquidation.45 The administration procedure allows a company to
maintain its liquid assets, thereby protecting shareholder and
employee interests.' The judicially supervised administration
procedure also embodies the goal of "preserving going-concern
values. '47  A few of the statutory "purposes" that are the bases
for granting administration orders reflect the policy of maintaining
going concern values as well.' Thus, the Insolvency Act repre-
sents the initial recognition, by Parliament, of the necessity of
reorganizations.
In order to facilitate feasible reorganizations, both the United
Kingdom and the United States want financially troubled business-
es to seek bankruptcy protection earlier, rather than later.49 For
41. See supra text accompanying note 17; Diane M. Hare & David Milman, Corporate
Insolvency: the Cork Committee Proposals-I, 127 SOLIC. J. 230, 231 (1983). The British
business community, as well as the Trade Union Congress, welcome the policy of
encouraging business reorganizations. Id.
42. The Benefits from Insolvency, 143 NEw L.J. 1089, 1089 (1993).
43. Anderson, supra note 11, at 51.
44. See id. at 49.
45. See supra text accompanying note 17.
46. See PENNINGTON, supra note 18, at 300.
47. Jay L. Westbrook, A Comparison of Bankruptcy Reorganisation in the US with the
Administration Procedure in the UK, 6 INSOLVENCY L. & PRAC. 86, 87 (1990). While the
United Kingdom claims its goal is to aid corporate rescues, many more reorganizations
under Chapter 11 result in the continuation of the company. Id. at 88.
48. A court will grant an administration order based on the goals of maintaining the
"survival of the company" and attaining a "more advantageous realisation of the
company's assets than would be effected on a winding up." Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45
§ 8(3)(a), (d). See infra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
49. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 33, at 220, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6179 (discussing U.S. bankruptcy goals); Hare & Milman, supra note 41, at 231 (discussing
U.K. bankruptcy goals).
1994]
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example, the debtor-in-possession mechanism of Chapter 11, which
allows pre-existing managers to retain their positions, may encour-
age debtors to seek bankruptcy protection at an earlier stage.
50
The United Kingdom has adopted a similar policy encouraging
companies to address their problems at an earlier point in time.
Accordingly, the Review Committee had reiterated that one goal
was to "devise an insolvency code which will facilitate rescues
rather than accelerate failures."'" In accordance with this goal,
a company should make an early attempt at reorganization before
creditors have exercised their rights and dismembered the
company. Moreover, it is contemplated that an early attempt at
reorganization may lessen prejudice to creditors.52 Thus, both
legal systems attempt to encourage earlier attempts at reorgani-
zation to improve a firm's chances of regaining stability.
Preventing creditors from engaging in a "race of diligence" is
critical to supporting a reorganization attempt. Both U.K. and
U.S. insolvency laws seek to provide a method for the orderly
treatment of creditors,53 and to avoid a race to the courthouse to
dismember the debtor's assets.- Bankruptcy laws seek to avoid
this type of competitive behavior by creditors. 5  Bankruptcy is a
collective approach that enables creditors to work as a group and
thus restricts a creditor's potentially self-interested behavior.56
Hence, the focus is on preserving the property of the bankruptcy
50. Harvey R. Miller et al., United States, Solving the Insoluble, INT'L FIN. L. REV. 50,
51 (Spec. Supp. 1990); see infra text accompanying notes 88-90; see discussion infra part
Iv.C.
51. Hare & Milman, supra note 41, at 231 (citing INSOLVENCY LAW AND PRACTICE
REPORT, supra note 16, at 340); see also Hill, supra note 37, at 47. But cf. discussion infra
part IV.C (discussing how, despite the Review Committee's recognition of the need to
encourage reorganization, the transfer of control undermines this effort).
52. REVISED FRAMEWORK, supra note 18, at 5.
53. INSOLVENCY LAW AND PRACIiCE REPORT, supra note 16, at 13 (discussing U.K.
insolvency law policy).
54. H.R. REP. NO. 595, supra note 33, at 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6297.
Both the United States and the United Kingdom provide automatic stay or moratorium
protection for the debtor as an effort to prevent a "race of diligence."
55. "The automatic stay also provides creditor protection. Without it, certain creditors
would be able to pursue their own remedies against the debtor's property." H.R. REP.
No. 595, supra note 33, at 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6297.
56. JACKSON, supra note 5, at 10; see supra text accompanying notes 53-55. A
collective bankruptcy system is especially necessary when the debtor cannot pay all of his
creditors.
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estate in order to increase the chances for an effective reorganiza-
tion.57
III. REVIEW OF CHAPTER 11
The structure of U.K. reorganization is better understood in
reference to criticism of Chapter 11. The flaws of Chapter 11 may
be indicators of the problems that U.K. reorganizations may also
encounter in the near future. This section will explore how the
current application of Chapter 11 accords with its underlying goals.
Reorganization under Chapter 11 is not a panacea for all
companies in financial distress; companies cannot resort to Chapter
11 protection and always expect to succeed. Bankruptcy laws are
not intended to prevent or correct business failures.5" Instead,
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code was designed to govern the
reorganization of corporations that are truly salvageable. In some
instances, assets are inefficiently spent on the maintenance of a
troubled business.
59
A. Strategic Use of Chapter 11
An increased number of corporate failures and the "strategic"
use of Chapter 11 have subjected Chapter 11 to close scrutiny.
This scrutiny, in turn, has led to discussions in Congress and
among commentators about reforming or repealing Chapter 11.'
Some commentators believe that Congress may soon address some
of these concerns.61 Nonetheless, the chairman of the National
Bankruptcy Conference has stated that, although some changes
57. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
58. See JACKSON, supra note 5, at 209.
59. Id. at 209-10.
60. See Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11,
101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1078 (1992). Bradley and Rosenzweig boldly argue that "Chapter 11
should be repealed, abolishing court-supervised corporate reorganization." Id. This article
has received quite a bit of attention from the popular press, academicians, and the
judiciary. For an in-depth examination of Bradley and Rosenzweig's article, see Bhandari
& Weiss, supra note 2. Despite the criticism of Chapter 11, several scholars and judges
maintain that Chapter 11 will remain an integral part of business planning. See, e.g., Lisa
H. Fenning, The Future of Chapter 11: One View from the Bench, 1993-1994 ANN. SURV.
BANKR. L. 113-18. "Recent law journal obituaries proclaiming that euthanasia is the only
remedy for what ails Chapter 11 are dramatic, but unwarranted." Id. at 118.
61. Maggs, supra note 3, at 681, 683.
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may be necessary, the main structure of Chapter 11 should be left
intact.62
The change in the use of bankruptcy has caused alarm.
Originally, bankruptcy served a protective function for debtors,
yet, more recently, it has changed into a business tool. Thus,
Chapter 11 may properly be considered more of a sword than a
shield.63 Bankruptcy is no longer a signal of failure and incompe-
tence, but, instead, has become an integral aspect of business
planning. Recent bankruptcy cases, such as that of Continental
Airlines,' have "increased the visibility of Chapter 11, [and]
legitimized bankruptcy as a respectable business option."'65 The
use of bankruptcy law has become strategic because debtors are
able to achieve "a limited organizational or political goal that
[they] had unsuccessfully pursued outside of the bankruptcy
arena.
, 66
Some recent Chapter 11 cases reveal the expansive scope of
Chapter 11 and the willingness of courts to grant bankruptcy
protection. The case of Continental Airlines exemplifies the broad
application of Chapter 11. The day after filing bankruptcy, Conti-
nental Airlines altered its labor union contracts without obtaining
bankruptcy court approval.67 Furthermore, Continental Airlines,
by availing itself of all statutory protection available under the
Bankruptcy Code, was able to remain in business.'
Corporations have also filed Chapter 11 when faced with
"pending or theoretical liabilities"' rather than imminent finan-
cial collapse. For example, 16,000 pending lawsuits, comprised
mainly of asbestos claims, prompted the Johns-Manville Corpora-
62. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter 11, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 729, 757. The
National Bankruptcy Conference is a private organization that provided a great deal of
guidance in drafting the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Id.
63. See generally Dale Ellis, The Shield as a Sword: How Major American Corpora-
tions Have Used Chapter 11, 1 FAULKNER & GRAY's BANKR. L. REV. 31 (1989)
(discussing how some large corporations have used Chapter 11 as an "offensive weapon").
64. In re Continental Airlines Corp., 38 B.R. 67 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1984).
65. Carl Frankel, Continental Spreads Its Wings: How Expansion in Chapter 11 Saved
an Airline, 1 FAULKNER & GRAY'S BANKR. L. REV. 10, 10 (1989).
66. Maggs, supra note 3, at 686.
67. Frankel, supra note 65, at 12; see Continental Airlines, 38 B.R. at 69. In reaction
to the unilateral alteration of labor union contracts, Congress enacted an amendment to
the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (1988) (setting forth how a debtor-in-
possession can "assume or reject a collective bargaining agreement").
68. Frankel, supra note 65, at 11.
69. Ellis, supra note 63, at 31.
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tion to file for bankruptcy relief.7 0 The court in Johns-Manville
Corp. held that a bankruptcy filing caused even by "tort-related"
economic pressures is not an abuse of bankruptcy court jurisdic-
tion.71 In response to this case, one commentator asserts that the
corporation filed bankruptcy in an attempt to avoid paying
punitive damages to its claimants. 2 The Johns-Manville Corp.
bankruptcy case demonstrates how Chapter 11 can enable a
"company to reestablish itself as a major American corporate
player. "73
B. Criticism of Chapter 11
1. Wrong Incentives
Some critics have asked whether the Bankruptcy Code itself
generates incentives that encourage businesses to file for bankrupt-
cy.74 Some commentators argue that the law creates incentives
for managers to file for bankruptcy because the "availability of
bankruptcy protection" causes managers to make unwise choices,
which then render the company insolvent.75 Thus, these commen-
tators claim that bankruptcy is "chosen by, rather than imposed
upon, corporate managers. 76  In contrast, other critics maintain
that economic factors cause corporate insolvencies. 77 Increased
corporate leveraging and changes in management structure are
some of the reasons why businesses collapse.78 The junk bond
market, frequent takeover activity, and international competition
are other factors that have contributed to the collapse of many
American businesses.
79
The Bankruptcy Code affords the debtor considerable
discretion in his treatment of creditors. The Bankruptcy Code
70. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 727, 729 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
71. Id. at 741.
72. Maggs, supra note 3, at 685.
73. Ellis, supra note 63, at 32. A major factor that led to the reemergence of Johns-
Manville Corporation was the bankruptcy court's decision to grant an injunction to prevent
further lawsuits even after the close of bankruptcy proceedings. Id.
74. See Bhandari & Weiss, supra note 2, at 138.
75. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 60, at 1047.
76. Id. Bradley and Rosenzweig contend that managers choose to overburden their
firms with debt. Id.
77. Bhandari & Weiss, supra note 2, at 139-43.
78. Id. at 139-40.
79. Id. at 139.
1994]
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empowers debtors with the following powers and protections:
s
8
(1) the automatic stay,"1 (2) the ability to assume or reject
executory contracts and unexpired leases,' (3) the ability to
compel the turnover of bankruptcy estate property,' 3 (4) the
avoidance powers of the debtor-in-possession or trustee,8 (5) the
debtor's exclusivity period to propose a reorganization plan,85 and
(6) the ability to obtain confirmation of a reorganization plan
without unanimous consent by creditors.8 6  As a result of these
statutory powers, some critics assert that the discretion wielded by
debtors inappropriately creates incentives that encourage debtors
to file for bankruptcy protection.87
Some commentators have also criticized the debtor-in-posses-
sion proceduire, 8 a salient feature of Chapter 11 that allows
existing management to maintain control of the business. This
mechanism allows managers to maintain their jobs even if the
company seeks reorganization. 89 Because incumbent management
will not be ousted, a debtor will have a strong incentive to pursue
80. Bradley and Rosenzweig have posited the enumerated powers described infra in
text accompanying notes 81-86. For a discussion of these powers, see Bradley &
Rosenzweig, supra note 60, at 1045 n.9.
81. See 11 U.S.C. § 362; see supra note 80. Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code
provides a stay with respect to the commencement of the "issuance or employment of
process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding." 11 U.S.C. § 362. The
stay also applies to the following: (1) enforcement of a pre-bankruptcy judgment, (2) acts
to repossess or exercise control over bankruptcy estate property, (3) acts to "create,
perfect, or enforce any lien," (4) acts to "create, perfect, or enforce any lien" before the
debtor filed bankruptcy, (5) acts to "collect, assess, or recover a claim" that arose prior to
the bankruptcy filing, (6) the "setoff of any debt" that arose before the bankruptcy filing,
and (7) the "commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United States Tax
Court." Id. § 362(a)(1)-(8) (1988).
82. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see supra note 80.
83. 11 U.S.C. §§ 542, 543 (1988); see supra note 80.
84. 11 U.S.C. §§ 544 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (strong arm clause), 545 (1988 & Supp.
V 1993) (avoiding statutory liens), 547 (1988) (avoiding preferences), 548 (1988 & Supp.
V 1993) (avoiding fraudulent transfers), 549 (1988) (avoiding postpetition transactions), 552
(1988) (avoiding postpetition effect of security interest), 553 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)
(setoff). See supra note 80.
85. 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (1988); see supra note 80.
86. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1126, 1129 (1988); see supra note 80. A debtor can proceed with
cramdown under § 1129(b) as long as one impaired class consents to the proposed plan.
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b).
87. See, e.g., Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 60, at 1045.
88. Compare infra part IV.C (discussing how the absence of a debtor-in-possession
procedure in U.K. reorganization schemes creates disincentives).
89. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 60, at 1045; LoPucki, supra note 62, at 733.
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reorganization under Chapter 11.' Although critics have found
fault with bankruptcy schemes that encourage premature filing,
encouraging debtors to seek bankruptcy protection at an early
stage may result in a larger number of successful reorganizations.
2. High Social Costs
There are several bases for the criticism that Chapter 11
reorganizations have a deleterious effect on society. Because
Chapter 11 is a vehicle both for the reordering of claims and the
collective treatment of creditors, there are serious concerns
regarding the cost that bankruptcy imposes on society and the
economy.
Creditors may bear a disproportionate loss during a reorgani-
zation. Creditors of an insolvent corporation must bear the
difference between the corporation's liabilities and its assets.91
Specifically, when the liabilities of a solvent company exceed its
assets, the difference is subtracted from the contributed capital.'
In a reorganization, assets are used to maintain operation of the
business;93 in a liquidation, those assets would be used to pay pre-
petition creditors.' Thus, creditors must often shoulder some of
the managerial and operational expenses required for the continua-
tion of the business during a reorganization."
Creditors may also potentially bear an economic loss as a
result of the automatic stay.' For example, the automatic stay
prevents a creditor from seizing the collateral when the debtor
defaults on his payments.' A creditor can try'to obtain relief
from the automatic stay so that he can pursue his remedies.98
One commentator asserts that the suspension of payments to
90. See Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 60, at 1045.
91. Lynn LoPucki, A General Theory of the Dynamics of the State Remedies]
Bankruptcy System, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 311, 328.
92. Id.
93. JORDAN & WARREN, supra note 35, at 656.
94. Id.
95. See id.
96. Id. at 661-62. For example, the automatic stay may remain effective to prevent
foreclosure or repossession, although the value of the creditor's collateral has decreased.
11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1988); JORDAN a WARREN, supra note 35, at 661-62; see also supra
note 81.
97. JORDAN & WARREN, supra note 35, at 661; see 11 U.S.C. § 362.
98. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1988). Yet, a creditor cannot obtain relief from stay if the
property is necessary for a reorganization. Id. § 362(d)(2)(A). Typically, it is difficult for
a creditor to show that the property is not necessary for a reorganization.
19941
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
creditors creates a "domino effect" because those creditors, in
turn, may need to seek bankruptcy protection.99 In sum, accord-
ing to these commentators, the suspension of payments to creditors
is potentially harmful to creditors and the economy.' °°
Another criticism is that bankruptcy laws induce managers to
engage in risky behavior 10 ' that negatively impacts the economy.
"[I]f managers know they can keep their jobs and not pay back
their debts, they are unlikely to borrow wisely."" In addition,
when lenders are faced with uncertainty concerning repayment,
they may lend less and increase interest rates in order to recoup
their losses. 03 Thus, when creditors suffer a loss, that loss may
be passed along to society.
IV. REVIEW OF U.K. REORGANIZATION SCHEMES
The Insolvency Act provides for the following corporate
insolvency options: (1) "liquidations," (2) "administrations," (3)
"composition schemes" ("including voluntary arrangements under
the Insolvency Act and schemes of arrangement under Companies
Act"), and (4) "receiverships."" Currently, the Insolvency
Act,'0 5 the Insolvency Rules of 1986,'" and the Company Di-
rectors Disqualification Act of 1986"° are together the statutory
99. LoPucki, supra note 62, at 738-39.
100. See generally id
101. Id. at 732. LoPucki states that Chapter 11 debtors may make not only unwise, but
"reckless" investment decisions. Id.
102. When Firms Fail, ECONOMIST, Mar. 14, 1992, at 82.
103. See id.
104. CAMPBELL, supra note 10, at 137. These four insolvency options are codified in
"The First Group of Parts" of the Insolvency Act. Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45 §§ 1-219.
Administrations and voluntary arrangements are "public procedures." CAMPBELL,
supra note 10, at 140. Thus, these procedures can be utilized regardless of the security
agreement between the debtor and his creditors. Id.
105. From the early days of English bankruptcy law, separate statutes existed for
individual and corporate debtors. These statutes were consolidated into one statutory
scheme by the Insolvency Act. Aminoff, supra note 8, at 125.
106. Insolvency Rules of 1986, S.I. 1986, No. 1925, amended by S.I. 1989, No. 397, S.I.
1991, No. 380, S.I. 1991, No. 495.
107. Company Directors Disqualification Act, 1986, ch. 46 (Eng.). The Company
Directors Disqualification Act of 1986 unified aspects of the Companies Act of 1985 and
the Insolvency Act of 1985 in the area of disqualifying people from acting as directors or
in related capacities. See PENNINGTON, supra note 18, at 1. The Company Directors
Disqualification Act of 1986 prohibits undischarged bankrupt individuals from becoming
directors, taking part in management, or participating in the formation of a corporation.
Id.
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bases for U.K. corporate insolvency. The administration order
procedure allows a corporation to reorganize,"O' and the volun-
tary arrangement procedure enables a corporation to avert a
threatened insolvency."
In the United Kingdom, the test for insolvency is the inability
of a company to pay its debts; this test has three interpreta-
tions.110 The first approach, a "balance sheet test,"' is similar
to the Bankruptcy Code approach, where insolvency results when
a debtor's liabilities exceed his assets.112  The second approach,
a "cash flow" standard, focuses on a debtor's ability to pay debts
as they become due."3 The third approach, called the "default-
based" test, deems a debtor insolvent if the debtor fails to pay for
21 days on an obligation of £750 or more, or if the debtor does not
satisfy a judgment."4 The definition of insolvency is particularly
relevant to the process of obtaining an administration order.
A. Administration Orders
The administration order procedure, a significant modification
to the U.K. insolvency system, is the U.K. counterpart to Chapter
11. In fact, Chapter 11 is "referred to as one possible model for
the [U.K.] administration order procedure.""' 5  One British
commentator believes that, had an administration procedure been
available earlier, many more firms would have survived."
6
The introduction of the administration order procedure signals
the adoption of the concept of "corporate rescues" in U.K.
insolvency law. For the first time in the United Kingdom, the
Insolvency Act provides a framework for a court-based administra-
tion procedure."7 This procedure enables a corporation to avoid
108. See infra part IV.A.
109. FLETCHER, supra note 14, at 334.
110. Jane Murphy & Stephen Pearson, United Kingdom, Solving the Insoluble, INT'L
FIN. L. REv. 41, 42 (Spec. Supp. 1990); CAMPBELL, supra note 10, at 138-39.
111. Anderson, supra note 11, at 54; see also CAMPBELL, supra note 10, at 138-39.
112. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(32) (Supp. V 1993). The Bankruptcy Code broadly defines
insolvency to mean that the debtor's debts.and liabilities are greater than his assets. Id.
113. Anderson, supra note 11, at 54; CAMPBELL, supra note 10, at 139.
114. CAMPBELL, supra note 10, at 138-39.
115. FLETCHER, supra note 14, at 347 n.4.
116. Keith Cuthbertson & John Hudson, Boom Time for Company Deaths, 6
INSOLVENCY L. & PRAC. 2, 3 (1990).
117. Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45 §§ 8-27.
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liquidation, which was required by the Companies Acts.1 8
Nevertheless, the administration order procedure is still closely
associated with liquidation."1 9 While a non-court-based adminis-
tration procedure previously existed under the Companies Act of
1985,120 the Insolvency Act has now replaced it with a court-
based procedure.121 The current Insolvency Act has incorporated
aspects of the Insolvency Act of 1985, which also included
administration provisions.
22
Since the enactment of the Insolvency Act, successful
reorganizations under the administration order procedure reveal
that administration can be a practicable solution for corporate
insolvencies. Several large British corporations have obtained
administration orders and continue to exist as going concerns. 3
In the Polly Peck International ("Polly Peck") administration
proceeding," for example, the administrators expected creditors
to receive a much larger share of corporate assets through an
administration scheme than they could have realized under a
liquidation. 5  Thus, the strategy in that case was to maximize
the realization of Polly Peck's assets, even though the process
might span several years. 6
1. Obtaining an Administration Order
Administration is a court-based procedure that allows a
corporation to make arrangements with its creditors, thus permit-
ting the business to continue its operations."7 A company may
118. Aminoff, supra note 8, at 125.
119. Carrington & Murphy, supra note 13, at 20. The process of obtaining an
administration order models the liquidation process. FLETCHER, supra note 14, at 360.
Thus, unlike the attitude towards Chapter 11, there is a stigma attached to the
administration procedure. Carrington & Murphy, supra note 13, at 20.
120. Companies Act, 1985, ch. 6 (Eng.).
121. It was difficult to devise a scheme under the Companies Act because it was
difficult to obtain the required majorities. James Lingard, Corporate Rescues-The Need
for Reform, 7 INT'L FIN. L. REV. 14, 14 (1988).
122. FLETCHER, supra note 14, at 346; see also supra notes 7, 19 and accompanying text.
123. Malcolm Cohen & Charles Pascoe, Surviving Along the Administration Route, 88
LAW Soc'Y's GAZETTE 24, 24 (1991).
124. Re A Company No. 009296 of 1990, 1992 BCC 510 (Ch. 1992) (LEXIS, Enggen
Library, Cases File).
125. Brenda Hannigan, Company Law, 141 NEW L.J. 1040, 1040 (1991). The
administrators predicted that an administration would provide 50 pence on the pound,
while a liquidation would provide creditors with only 20 pence. Id.
126. Id.
127. See PENNINGTON, supra note 18, at 300.
1000 [Vol. 16:985
Reorganization Schemes
obtain an administration order as long as a secured creditor does
not appoint an administrative receiver who refuses to consent to
the administration order." a The administration order procedure
is intended to serve only as a temporary procedure that will give
the debtor a brief respite from his creditors.129 An appointed
administrator decides whether parts of the business will be sold or
will continue to operate. 130  Once a debtor has entered into
administration, liquidation of the whole or part of the corporation
is still possible. Once a corporation has commenced liquidation,
however, it cannot obtain an administration order.
131
The Insolvency Act specifies (1) the types of companies that
are qualified to obtain an administration order, and (2) which
individuals or entities can apply for an order. In order to qualify
for an administration order, a company must be registered either
under the Companies Act of 1985132 or under previous Compa-
nies Acts.133 "An application to the court for an administration
order shall be by petition presented either by the company or the
directors, or by a creditor or creditors (including any contingent or
prospective creditor or creditors), or by all or any of those parties,
together or separately., 134  Also, the Insolvency Act will not
allow "individual members" or individual shareholders, in such
capacities, to petition for an administration order.
135
In order for a company to pursue an administration, it must
satisfy two conditions: (1) the inability to pay its debts,136 and (2)
the likelihood of achieving one or more of its authorized specified
"purposes., 137 The petition must specifically state the "purpose"
of an administration. The petitioner must persuade the court that
the "purpose" is at least one or more of the following: (1) survival
128. Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45 § 10(3).
129. CAMPBELL, supra note 10, at 154.
130. Philippe Aghion et al., The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, 8 J.L. ECON. &
ORGANIZATION 523, 530 (1992).
131. Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45 § 8(4).
132. See supra note 120.
133. PENNINGTON, supra note 18, at 301. In contrast to Chapter 11, which applies to
business and non-business debtors, the administration order procedure under the
Insolvency Act only applies to companies. FLETCHER, supra note 14, at 346.
134. Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45 § 9(1), amended by Companies Act, 1989, ch. 40,
sched. 16 (Eng.).
135. PENNINGTON, supra note 18, at 302.
136. Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45 § 8(1)(a). For a discussion about the test for
insolvency, see supra text accompanying notes 110-14.
137. Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45 § 8(1)(b).
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of the company, or at least a part of it; (2) "approval of a
voluntary arrangement" under the Insolvency Act; (3) sanction of
a compromise under section 425 of the Companies Act of 1985138
or an "arrangement"; or (4) a better realization of assets, through
a reorganization, than what is possible through a liquidation.1
39
Most often, the proponent will obtain an administration order by
persuading the court that the company, or a portion of it, will
survive, or that an administration will produce better realization of
assets than would a liquidation."4 In support of the petition,
most companies present a report, from an independent source,
concerning the practicability of an administration.141
The proponent of the administration plan bears the burden of
presenting evidence to satisfy both prongs-that the company
cannot pay its debts and that the order is "likely to achieve" the
proposed "purpose(s). 1 42  The court in Re Consumer and
Industrial Press Ltd. 143 concluded that the first prong-the
inability to pay debts-was satisfied on the basis of the company's
balance sheet, which reflected a deficit of over £130,000.1'
Several courts have supplied different interpretations of the second
prong, which is the "likely to achieve" requirement of section
8(1)(b). 45 Some courts, such as the Re Rowbotham Baxter
Ltd.146 court, have interpreted the language as requiring a "real
prospect";147 other courts have applied "more probably than
138. Companies Act, 1985, ch. 6 § 425. See section 427 for the "provisions for
facilitating company reconstruction and amalgamation." Id. § 427.
139. Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45 § 8(3)(a)-(d). For a discussion about the "purposes"
of an administration, see PENNINGTON, supra note 18, at 304-07.
140. Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45 § 8(3)(a), (d); Groves, supra note 27, at 18.
141. Typically, the insolvency practitioner prepares and presents the report. Groves,
supra note 27, at 17.
142. PENNINGTON, supra note 18, at 308; see supra text accompanying notes 139-40.
143. 1988 PCC 436 (Ch. 1987).
144. Id. at 439.
145. One commentator suggests a lower standard, which would enable a court to grant
an order as long as the administration order petition is reasonable. Hill, supra note 37, at
57.
146. 1990 BCLC 397 (Ch. 1989).
147. Id. at 397. The Rowbotham court dismissed the administration order petition
because there was no "real prospect" that the company could achieve any of its
"purpose(s)." The ruling was based on the following reasons: (1) it would be difficult to
"ascertain who would be the persons entitled to attend a meeting to approve the voluntary
arrangement," and (2) there was insufficient funding to sustain an administration. Id.
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not"' 148 and "just more likely than not"149 standards. One com-
mentator indicates that there is no real discernible or meaningful
distinction among these standards.15 ° If the proponent cannot
meet the burden of proof on both prongs, liquidation of the
company will ensue.
If a court is satisfied that the proponent has met all the
requisite conditions, the court has discretion to grant an adminis-
tration order.' The court has discretion to consider "off-
setting" factors that weigh against granting an order, even if it is
likely that the administration would achieve one or more of its
statutory "purposes." '52 In deciding whether to grant an order,
the court will balance interests to assess the benefits of an adminis-
tration over a liquidation. 53 For example, in Consumer and
Industrial Press Ltd., the court evaluated the benefits that secured
creditors would receive, 54 even though the statutory "purposes"
could have been achieved with an administration order.
Once an administration order is in place, a statutory moratori-
um provides the debtor with a "breathing spell., 15 5 The morato-
rium is similar to the automatic stay provided by the Bankruptcy
Code. 56 While a moratorium is in effect, the corporation cannot
be liquidated, acts to enforce liens are prohibited, an administra-
148. Consumer and Indus. Press Ltd., 1988 PCC at 439. The Consumer court was
satisfied that an administration order would allow a reorganization that would produce
more value than a liquidation. The court relied on evidence that the company had
reduced its overhead, which would enable the company to once again be profitable. Thus,
the court granted the administration order and dismissed the "winding up" petition. Id.
at 440-42. The court in Harris Simons Construction criticized the Consumer court for
setting the "standard of probability too high." In re Harris Simons Construction Ltd.,
[1989] 1 W.L.R. 369, 370 (Ch. 1988).
149. Sally Wheeler, Insolvency Act 1986 Part II-A Look at Current Judicial Attitudes,
7 TOLLEY'S INSOLVENCY L. & PRAC. 69, 70 (1991) (citing Re Chelmsford City Football
Club, 1991 BCC 133 (Ch. 1991)).
150. Id.
151. Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45 § 8(1)(a), (b); Rowbotham Baxter, 1990 BCLC at 399.
152. FLETCHER, supra note 14, at 351.
153. Id.
154. Consumer and Indus. Press Ltd., 1988 PCC at 442.
155. Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45 § 11(3). The Insolvency Act provides protection to
the debtor upon presentation of the application for an administration order. See id.
§ 10(1); see also infra note 157 and accompanying text.
156. See 11 U.S.C. § 362; see also supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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tive receiver cannot be appointed, and other proceedings cannot
be commenced without leave of court. 57
2. Creditors
The administration order procedure significantly alters some
rights traditionally held by secured creditors.'58 For example,
section 15 of the Insolvency Act permits an administrator to
dispose of assets subject to a security interest if the disposition
would promote the "purpose(s)" of the administration order.'59
Thus, secured creditors must yield or compromise in order to allow
the debtor to attempt reorganization."6  The secured creditor
must take the initiative to safeguard his own rights. 6'
The Insolvency Act sets out some of the protections available
to creditors and members of a corporation. 6 2  A creditor or
member may apply to the court to protect his interests in the
following circumstances: (1) if the company's affairs are being
managed in a manner that is prejudicial to the creditor or member,
or (2) if an "actual or proposed act or omission of the administra-
tor is or would be so prejudicial."' 63 The language of section 27
is purposefully broad, and the court's powers are commensurately
expansive.14 Thus, as a protective measure, the court can pre-
157. Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45 § 11(3)(a)-(d).
During the period for which an administration order is in force-
(a) no resolution may be passed or order made for the winding up of the
company;
(b) no administrative receiver of the company may be appointed;
(c) no other steps may be taken to enforce any security over the company's
property, or to repossess goods in the company's possession under any hire-
purchase agreement, except with the consent of the administrator or the leave of
the court and subject (where the court gives leave) to such terms as the court
may impose; and
(d) no other proceedings and no execution or other legal process may be
commenced or continued, and no distress may be levied, against the company or
its property except with the consent of the administrator or leave of the court
and subject (where the court gives leave) to such terms as aforesaid.
Id.
158. Hamish Anderson, Administration: Rights of Secured Creditors, 6 INSOLVENCY L.
& PRAC. 130, 130 (1991).
159. Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45 § 15(1), (2).
160. Anderson, supra note 158, at 137.
161. Id.
162. See Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45 § 27.
163. Id. § 27(1)(a)-(b).
164. FLETCHER, supra note 14, at 381; see Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45 § 27.
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scribe specific directions to regulate an administrator's managerial
powers.165
In general, secured creditors and lenders have more discretion
in an administration under the Insolvency Act than in a Chapter
11 reorganization.'66 Creditors from the United States and the
United Kingdom can exercise some monitoring authority through
the appointment of creditors' committees.'67 Section 26 of the
Insolvency Act enables creditors to form their own committees by
their own initiative. 6 Creditors' committees, either under the
Insolvency Act or the Bankruptcy Code, have few formal powers.
Hence, a U.K. creditors' committee has "no coercive or directory
powers which may be exercised in relation to the administra-
tor., 169  The Review Committee envisioned that a continuous
flow of information to creditors regarding the progress of the
administration was a necessary component of insolvency law. 7'
This supply of information enables creditors to evaluate the
effectiveness of an administration, in light of the proposed "pur-
pose(s).''
In some instances, creditors are able to circumvent the
moratorium and other effects of an administration order. An
administration order freezes a creditor's ability to enforce liens or
commence other proceedings against the debtor unless the court
172permits the creditor to act. If a creditor obtains leave of court,
the court may allow him to commence proceedings against the
debtor. 73  A court will grant leave if a creditor can persuade the
165. FLETCHER, supra note 14, at 381.
166. See Westbrook, supra note 47, at 87.
167. See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1103.07, at 1103-25 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th
ed. 1993) (discussing creditors' committees in the United States); FLETCHER, supra note
14, at 380-81 (discussing creditors' committees in the United Kingdom).
168. Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45 § 26(1). "Where a meeting of creditors summoned
under section 23 has approved the administrator's proposals (with or without modifica-
tions), the meeting may, if it thinks fit, establish a committee ('the creditors' committee')
to exercise the functions conferred on it by or under this Act." Id.
169. FLETCHER, supra note 14, at 381. It may appear that a creditors' committee does
not fulfill a substantial role in the administration process; however, the flow of information
and monitoring is important. Id.
170. Id. at 380-81.
171. Id. at 381.
172. PENNINGTON, supra note 18, at 321; see supra note 157 and accompanying text.
173. See Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45 § 11(3); see supra note 157; cf 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(d)(1), (2).
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court of a "good reason" to depart from the administration or-
der. 74 "The administrator should ... give effect to the creditor's
rights, unless to do so would prevent or impede the administrator
achieving the purposes for which the administration order was
made.' ' 175  Nonetheless, courts are reluctant to grant leave to
secured creditors after an administration order is already in ef-
fect.1
76
3. Discharge
A discharge, which concludes an administration, will return
the debtor and the creditors to the positions they were in prior to
the administration order. 77 Because debtors can no longer seek
moratorium protection provided by an administration, creditors
can resume exercising their pre-existing legal remedies. 78  For
example, creditors can resume their normal debt collection
remedies, although certain transactions voided during the course
of the administration remain invalid.
79
A court may grant a discharge on several grounds. First, the
administrator can apply to the court for a discharge when the
"purpose(s)" of the "proposal" have been achieved or if it appears
that the "purpose(s)" cannot be fulfilled."8 A common reason
for applying for discharge is the failure to achieve the "purposes"
underlying the administration order.18 ' In such a situation, the
court may order a "winding up" of the company after granting a
discharge. 82  Through a resolution, creditors can also require
that the administrator apply for discharge.183  Second, another
typical ground for discharge is creditor disapproval of the "propos-
als" of the administration order.1
174. PENNINGTON, supra note 18, at 320; cf. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1), (2).
175. PENNINGTON, supra note 18, at 321.
176. Id. at 320.
177. Id. at 355-56; see Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45 § 18.
178. PENNINGTON, supra note 18, at 355-56.
179. See id. at 356. For example, transfers analogous to preferential and fraudulent
transfers under the Bankruptcy Code remain invalid after the discharge of an administra-
tion order. See id.
180. Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45 § 18(2)(a); PENNINGTON, supra note 18, at 354-55.
181. PENNINGTON, supra note 18, at 355.
182. Id. at 356-57.
183. Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45 § 18(2)(b).
184. Id. § 24(5); PENNINGTON, supra note 18, at 355; cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1129.
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Third, the same discharge procedure also applies if the
administrator wishes to change the original administration order to
specify an alternative "purpose" that is possible to achieve.
185
This route does not conclude the administration; rather, it is a
method to articulate another "purpose" that is attainable, thus
enabling the debtor to continue the reorganization attempt.
B. Voluntary Arrangements
Voluntary arrangements enable a company to make agree-
ments or compromises with other third parties who have rights
against the company."8 A company can either (1) enter into an
agreement to alter rights, even when there is no current dis-
pute, ' or (2) formulate an arrangement to pay either the whole
debt or a portion of it back to creditors."s Thus, in hopes of
completing payment for its debts, a company can use the proce-
dure to alter creditors' rights or to gain an extension.
1. Obtaining a Voluntary Arrangement
Under the Insolvency Act, the voluntary arrangement proce-
dure is closely connected to the administration order procedure.
Companies can propose voluntary arrangements alone or in
conjunction with an administration.189 A debtor can simulta-
neously propose a voluntary arrangement and an administration
order because a voluntary arrangement can be one of the specified
"purposes" of an administration order."9 Often, a company will
devise a voluntary arrangement "under the umbrella of an
administration" because there is no effective moratorium after the
approval of a voluntary arrangement.'9 I In contrast to adminis-
trations, parties can enter into voluntary arrangements even when
the company is about to be liquidated."l
185. Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45 § 18(1); PENNINGTON, supra note 18, at 355.
186. PENNINGTON, supra note 18, at 358.
187. Id. at 359. Companies have implied powers to enter into arrangements, whether
there is a current dispute or not. See id. at 358.
188. Id. at 359.
189. See Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45 § 3(a).
190. Id. § 8(3)(b).
191. Groves, supra note 27, at 18; see FLETCHER, supra note 14, at 334-35; see infra part
IV.B.2.
192. Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45 § 3(b); PENNINGTON, supra note 18, at 358.
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The Insolvency Act incorporated the voluntary arrangement
procedure in response to the need for a simple method by which
a corporation and its creditors could formulate a legally binding
agreement. 193  Although voluntary arrangements were possible
under the Companies Acts prior to the enactment of the Insolven-
cy Act, they were more complicated and required more ex-
pense.194 In order to encourage corporations to participate in
voluntary arrangements, the Review Committee proposed an
arrangement that would not require a court order to make the
scheme binding on the parties.'9" The result is the voluntary
arrangement procedure, which parties can conduct either as a
court-based or non-court-based procedure."9 If conducted with-
out court intervention, parties can enter into an agreement under
the supervision of an insolvency practitioner."9  Moreover, be-
cause there is no requirement that the company be registered
under the current or previous Companies Acts, many more compa-
nies can employ the procedure. 9 8 Although a voluntary arrange-
ment is less complex and less costly than the administration order
procedure, it is still far less utilized than the administration order
procedure. 99
Directors of a company," an administrator,"°t or a liqui-
dator0 2 can commence a voluntary arrangement by presenting
193. FLETCHER, supra note 14, at 333.
194. Lingard, supra note 121, at 14; CAMPBELL, supra note 10, at 140; FLETCHER, supra
note 14, at 333. While voluntary arrangements are more often pursued under the guidance
of the Insolvency Act, they are still possible under the Companies Act. CAMPBELL, supra
note 10, at 140. The Companies Act mandates a cumbersome majority requirement for
class meetings. Lingard, supra note 121, at 14.
195. INSOLVENCY LAW AND PRACTICE REPORT, supra note 16, at 102-03. While a
court order is not necessary to bind the parties, the court has a limited amount of control
over the process. The court can revoke or suspend the approval given at meetings, and
if the meetings demonstrate a "material irregularity," the parties will have to revise or
reconsider the proposal. FLETCHER, supra note 14, at 343.
196. Anderson, supra note 11, at 59.
197. Murphy & Pearson, supra note 110, at 47.
198. PENNINGTON, supra note 18, at 381. Compare supra text accompanying notes 132-
33 (stating that a company must be registered under the Companies Acts to qualify for the
administration order procedure).
199. CAMPBELL, supra note 10, at 155; see infra part IV.B.2.
200. Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45 § 1(1). "(1) The directors of a company ... may
make a proposal under this Part to the company and to its creditors for a composition in
satisfaction of its debts or a scheme of arrangement of its affairs .... " Id.
201. Id. § 3(a); see supra text accompanying note 189.
202. Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45 § 3(b); see supra text accompanying note 192.
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a "proposal" to the company and creditors. The Insolvency Act
does not clearly define the terms that a "proposal" must con-
tain.2 3 Unlike an administration, which requires the proponent
to prove the company's inability to pay its debts, 2 4 a voluntary
arrangement can be proposed even when the company is not
insolvent.2 5
The company and its creditors must convene to discuss
whether to approve and/or modify the voluntary arrangement.2
°6
All creditors known to the company must receive notice of
creditors' meetings.20 7 The rights of secured creditors are safe-
guarded by the requirement that creditors must "concur" with a
"proposal" that alters their rights. 208  Once the voluntary ar-
rangement is approved, it binds every person who received proper
notice and was entitled to vote in the approval process.2°  One
potential disadvantage is that the arrangement does not bind
creditors who do not receive proper notice.20  Nevertheless, the
notified parties may implement the voluntary arrangement, unless
it is challenged. Unfair prejudice to creditors or "material
irregularity at or in relation to ... the meetings" are grounds to
challenge the approval of the "proposal.
211
Courts grant a significant amount of freedom to fashion
schemes under the voluntary arrangement procedure in order to
encourage companies to "initiate schemes of the widest vari-
ety.521 2  Courts have intentionally refrained from defining the
types of schemes they will approve.213  Nonetheless, court-
approved schemes have fallen into three broad categories. These
schemes include "capitally insufficient companies,, 214 reorganiza-
203. FLETCHER, supra note 14, at 335.
204. See supra text accompanying note 136.
205. FLETCHER, supra note 14, at 334.
206. Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45 §§ 3, 4(1); see FLETCHER, supra note 14, at 339.
207. CAMPBELL, supra note 10, at 155.
208. Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45 § 4(3); CAMPBELL, supra note 10, at 155.
209. FLETCHER, supra note 14, at 342. The arrangement is binding upon parties as long
as they had the opportunity to vote. It is not required that the creditors be "present or
represented at the meeting." Id.
210. Murphy & Pearson, supra note 110, at 47.
211. Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45 § 6(1)(a), (b); FLETCHER, supra note 14, at 343. For
the various steps a court can take when presented with a challenge to an arrangement, see
Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45 § 6(4)(a), (b).
212. PENNINGTON, supra note 18, at 383.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 384. The scheme would alter the rights of the members or creditors. Id.
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tions,215 and "reconstructions, mergers or divisions., 216  In gen-
eral, courts will approve a scheme as long as it is fair to all
affected parties.217
2. Lack of Moratorium in Voluntary Arrangements
A major drawback of the voluntary arrangement procedure is
the lack of moratorium protection during the time period between
the presentation of a "proposal" and the implementation of the
arrangement.2 8 Without a moratorium, which is a fundamental
bankruptcy protection, "creditors could continue their dismember-
ment processes, and any hopes of reorganization would be
rendered meaningless., 219  Because creditors can exercise their
rights before a moratorium is in effect, the company may no longer
exist by the time it is able to implement an arrangement. 220 In
order to compensate for the missing moratorium, voluntary
arrangements are often used in conjunction with administration or-
ders.
221
Using both the voluntary arrangement and the administration
procedures may be too cumbersome or costly for some debtors.
Therefore, it is more likely that companies will opt to use the
administration procedure alone for its immediate moratorium,
rather than coupling it with a voluntary arrangement. One scholar
predicts that this drawback will discourage companies from
pursuing voluntary arrangements, an otherwise potentially valuable
procedure.222 In fact, statistics reveal that companies use the
voluntary arrangement procedure far less often than the adminis-
tration order procedure.2' If moratorium protection were to
become available in the future, it is likely that an increased
number of debtors would employ the voluntary arrangement
procedure.
215. Id. at 385. Reorganizations alter shareholders' and lenders' rights, or allow the
company to raise new funds or restructure its capital structure. Id.
216. Id. at 382.
217. Id. at 383.
218. CAMPBELL, supra note 10, at 156; FLETCHER, supra note 14, at 334-35.
219. RICHARD F. BROUDE, REORGANIZATIONS UNDER CHAPTER 11 OF THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE § 3.01, at 4-2 (1993).
220. Hill, supra note 37, at 48.
221. See CAMPBELL, supra note 10, at 156; FLETCHER, supra note 14, at 335.
222. FLETCHER, supra note 14, at 335.
223. Between 1987 and 1989, the number of voluntary arrangements constituted less
than 25% of the total number of administrations. Hill, supra note 37, at 47.
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C. Management During Administrations and Voluntary
Arrangements
The U.K. and U.S. insolvency regimes offer fundamentally
different approaches regarding the exercise of management control
during insolvency proceedings. 224  In an administration, control
is abdicated to a new agent, who is independent of pre-existing
management. In a voluntary arrangement, a "nominee" will
exercise some control, but the transfer of managerial control is not
as drastic as in administrations.2' Several British commentators
argue that management by parties other than the pre-existing
company managers and owners creates disincentives, 22 6 which
227decrease the chances that a firm will seek reorganization.
While Parliament may have had Chapter 11 in mind, the U.K.
reorganization framework did not incorporate the Chapter 11
debtor-in-possession management model. After comparing the
management mechanisms of the Insolvency Act to those of
Chapter 11, British commentators have favorably reviewed the
U.S. debtor-in-possession procedure. 22
1. Chapter 11 Debtor-in-Possession
In the United States, once a debtor files a case under Chapter
11, existing management may continue to operate and manage the
business as the debtor-in-possession.229 In many Chapter 11
cases, the debtor-in-possession remains the "focal point."'  The
debtor-in-possession is the same entity as the debtor, but is
"empowered by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code to deal with its
contracts and property in a manner it could not have done absent
the bankruptcy filing." 1  Also, the debtor-in-possession has a
224. See Lingard, supra note 121, at 14. Lingard points out that the United States and
the United Kingdom have completely different attitudes regarding who should remain in
control. Id.
225. See Harry Rajak, Company Rescue, 9 TOLLEY'S INSOLVENCY L. & PRAC. 111, 111
(1993).
226. See Hill, supra note 37, at 51.
227. Id. In contrast, U.S. critics have assailed the U.S. debtor-in-possession procedure
for creating the wrong incentives that induce debtors to file for bankruptcy prematurely
or inappropriately. See supra text accompanying notes 88-90.
228. See Lingard, supra note 121, at 14-15. See generally Hill, supra note 37.
229. See 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (1988).
230. BROUDE, supra note 219, at 3-5.
231. Id. at 3-2 to 3-3 nn. 9-10; see supra text accompanying notes 81-84.
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fiduciary duty to manage responsibly and conserve the bankruptcy
estate for the benefit of creditors. 2  An appointed trustee will
replace the debtor-in-possession only when there is fraud or
incompetence, or when it is in the interest of creditors." The
court will not "scrutinize or entertain objections to ordinary course
transactions." 234  Generally, the debtor-in-possession remains
autonomous in operating the company.
Prevalent social attitudes about debtors explain in part the
absence of a debtor-in-possession mechanism in the United
Kingdom. In contrast to the U.S. debtor, the U.K. debtor is not
the focus of a reorganization attempt. 35  Britons adopt the
"prevailing view ... that the prior owners were the ones whose
venality or incompetence created the problem"; 26 hence, a new
agent should exercise control. Because threads of a retributive
attitude toward debtors still remain, pre-existing management does
not get a second chance during the reorganization stage.237
Similarly, other countries that espouse "harsher societal attitudes"
against debtors have declined to adopt the debtor-in-possession
mechanism. 3
2. Administrations
In a U.K. administration, pre-existing management does not
exercise control over the company. The court appoints an
administrator who is a licensed practitioner. 9  The majority of
these practitioners are accountants, but a minority are solici-
tors.2' Initially, the administrator prepares "proposals" regard-
ing how the underlying "purposes" of the administration order will
be achieved.24 The administrator's main function is to manage
232. BROUDE, supra note 219, at 3-4.
233. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)-(2) (1988). Replacing the debtor-in-possession with a
trustee is a drastic remedy. Miller et al., supra note 50, at 54. There is a strong
presumption that the debtor will remain in control of the insolvent corporation.
234. EPsTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 740.
235. Compare supra text accompanying note 230. In the United Kingdom, the
insolvency practitioner is the intended focus of the Insolvency Act. CAMPBELL, supra note
10, at 138.
236. Westbrook, supra note 47, at 88.
237. See Hill, supra note 37, at 52; see Westbrook, supra note 47, at 88.
238. Flaschen & DeSieno, supra note 29, at 683.
239. Anderson, supra note 11, at 51; see Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45 § 13(1).
240. Anderson, supra note 11, at 51.
241. See Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45 §§ 14(1)(a), 17(1)-(2); PENNINGTON, supra note
18, at 327.
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the corporation, including the exercise of control over corporate
property.242 The administrator acts as an agent of the corpora-
tion;243 however, he is not personally liable for the contracts he
enters into in the course of his activities as an administrator.
2"
While the administrator must follow court orders, he has "general
power" to make managerial decisions concerning the corpora-
tion.2 45
3. Voluntary Arrangements
The voluntary arrangement procedure also does not effectively
leave pre-existing management in place. Although the original
management remains, a new nominee acts as a "trustee or
otherwise for the purpose of supervising" the implementation of
the voluntary arrangement. 246  In order to maintain a level of
competence and to combat prior abuses under the previous laws,
the Insolvency Act requires that a qualified insolvency practitioner
serve as nominee.2' Upon approval of the voluntary arrange-
ment scheme, the directors must transfer possession of the
corporate assets to the nominee.24' Thus, the nominee exercises
substantial control.
4. Incumbent Management Should Remain
Transferring either all or partial managerial control to an
administrator or an insolvency practitioner creates disincentives
which discourage debtors from seeking reorganization. Many
British practitioners are concerned about the disincentives created
by the transfer of control.249 Some critics believe that weak
242. PENNINGTON, supra note 18, at 327; see Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45 §§
14(1)(a), 17(l)-(2).
243. Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45 § 14(5).
244. PENNINGTON, supra note 18, at 325.
245. Id. at 327. The administrator's decisions must be consistent with the proposal of
"purposes" on which the administration order was based. See id.
246. Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45 § 1(2). The nominee's first function is to prepare and
present a report of his assessment regarding the practicability of the voluntary arrange-
ment. FLETCHER, supra note 14, at 336. The nominee is empowered to approve the
proposal for the voluntary arrangement. Id. at 337.
247. See FLETCHER, supra note 14, at 335-36; REVISED FRAMEWORK, supra note 18,
at 10.
248. Lingard, supra note 121, at 14.
249. Rajak, supra note 225, at 112; see Lingard, supra note 121, at 14; see Hill, supra
note 37, at 51-52.
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management causes many corporate insolvencies. 2 °  Thus, the
solution is to reform management, not to oust it. It is also
preferable to keep old management in place because the original
managers have the necessary expertise to run the company.251
Some commentators argue that the existence of a debtor-in-
possession procedure would promote more successful reorgani-
zations because the procedure would provide management with the
necessary incentives to seek insolvency schemes earlier on. 2
Managers have an incentive to improve because they usually want
to prevent or forestall creditors from seeking liquidation of the
company.5 3  Hence, one suggestion is to allow pre-existing
management to remain, but to address the managerial flaws which
cause or contribute, to a company's financially troubled state.24
In such a scheme, the nominee or insolvency practitioner would
play a smaller advisory role.1
Under the current regime, when management has to "surren-
der control" while "admitting failure," it is less willing to seek
insolvency protection." In the United States, Congress knew
that ousting incumbent management would make debtors wait
longer to attempt reorganization. 7  In the United Kingdom,
management's unwillingness to transfer control of the business may
be a factor contributing to the small number of administrations
and voluntary arrangements. 258 Furthermore, because insolvency
practitioners, rather than the original managers, undertake control
250. Lingard, supra note 121, at 14. American commentators also believe that weak
management is a significant cause of business failures. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in
Full Control-Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code? (2d installment),
57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247, 263 (1983).
251. Lingard, supra note 121, at 14.
252. See Hill, supra note 37, at 52. In contrast, American commentators have criticized
the debtor-in-possession procedure for inappropriately encouraging debtors to seek
Chapter 11 protection. See supra text accompanying notes 88-90.
253. Lingard, supra note 121, at 14.
254. See id.
255. See Hill, supra note 37, at 52.
256. Id.
257. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 33, at 233-34 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6192-93.
258. See Lingard, supra note 121, at 14; Hill, supra note 37, at 52. In 1989, there were
43 voluntary arrangements and 135 administrations; in contrast, there were 10,440
liquidations. Hill, supra note 37, at 47.
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of the troubled company, many administration orders result in
liquidation.259
British practitioners recognize the possibility of abuse under
the Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession procedure. Yet, the risk of
abuse may be preferable to the unfavorable results that occur
when the original managers lose their managerial control. In sum,
the disincentives created by ousting pre-existing management
undermine the Insolvency Act's underlying goal of promoting
reorganizations. 6
D. Suitability of UK. Reorganization Schemes for Small Firms
In both the United Kingdom and the United States, the
application of one statutory scheme to small and large reorgani-
zation cases has proven ineffective. The size of the corporation is
critical when determining whether a reorganization attempt will be
successful. Small, medium, and large corporations have different
considerations once they are in the midst of bankruptcy proceed-
ings. As a result of a wide spectrum of business sizes and forms,
it is difficult to create a uniform reorganization procedure to
accommodate the variety of businesses.26 Although reorganiza-
tion procedures are fairly new developments in the United
Kingdom, there are already strong indicators that the procedures
are better suited for larger firms.
1. Cost Barrier
As in the United States, smaller U.K. firms are disproport-
ionately disadvantaged in a reorganization. The British Parlia-
ment, however, intended that both small and large companies
would be able to employ the procedures under the Insolvency
Act. 62 Some commentators have also indicated their hopes that
the insolvency procedures would be "deployed in even quite small
259. Lingard, supra note 121, at 15. Most insolvency practitioners are experienced in
selling financially troubled companies, rather than sustaining them. Id.
260. For a discussion about the goal of encouraging reorganizations, see supra part
II.B.2.
261. See LoPucki, supra note 62, at 756. See generally Skeel, supra note 38, at 509-20
(arguing that a single approach to reorganization is not effective to meet the needs of both
closely-held and non-closely-held corporations). Chapter 11 was primarily designed for
larger firms; the drafters of Chapter 11 were mainly concerned about larger reorganization
cases that are more capable of absorbing the high costs of the procedure. LoPucki, supra
note 62, at 756.
262. See Hill, supra note 37, at 57.
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cases." 263  Unfortunately, the current situation proves that
reorganization schemes are costly, and are not equally applied to
small firms.2' Prior to the enactment of the Insolvency Act, the
Review Committee was cognizant of the potential difficulties that
small firms could face in using the reorganization procedures.
Hence, the Review Committee initially recommended a voluntary
arrangement scheme that would not require court involvement,265
resulting in the reduction of costs. The recent Insolvency Act,
however, did not incorporate this suggestion.26  In sum, the
administration and voluntary arrangement procedures must be
affordable in order to be accessible to smaller firms.
267
The Chancery Division has stated its concerns about the high
costs of reorganization and the resulting effects on smaller
firms. 268 The court stated that reorganization costs should not
undercut the "rehabilitation" goal behind the Insolvency Act.269
"The costs of obtaining an administration order should not operate
as a disincentive or put the process out of reach of smaller compa-
nies., 270  Supporting reports that accompany the initial adminis-
tration application, which are "unnecessarily elaborate and
detailed," cause the increase in costs. 271  As a result, the court
has affirmatively stated that "[e]very endeavor should be made to
avoid disproportionate investigation and expense.,
27 2
Several British scholars and practitioners have also observed
that debtors incur high costs in employing reorganization
schemes.273 High costs are inherent in administrations because
administrations require extensive information and a great deal of
263. Anderson, supra note 11, at 58.
264. See Jeremy Goldring, Administrations-Practical Lesson of the First Two Years,
5 INSOLVENCY L. & PRAC. 2, 8 (1989). In the United States, the costs of Chapter 11 are
relatively higher for smaller firms than for larger firms that usually have a bigger reserve
from which to draw. Charles M. Tatelbaum, Chapter 10-Bankruptcy Reorganization for
Small Businesses, 4 FAULKNER & GRAY'S BANKR. L. REV. 33, 33 (1992).
265. Hill, supra note 37, at 57.
266. Id.
267. See Flaschen & DeSieno, supra note 29, at 670. "Inexpensive access" should be
an important principle behind any insolvency system. Id.
268. Chancery Division Practice Note, [19941 1 All E.R. 324 (Ch. 1994).
269. Id. at 324.
270. Id. (emphasis added).
271. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 141.
272. [1994] 1 All E.R. at 325.
273. Hill, supra note 37, at 57; CAMPBELL, supra note 10, at 137.
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preparation.274 A typical administration will cost a minimum of
£20,000,275 which is usually prohibitive for small companies.
276
In an administration and voluntary arrangement, a debtor expends
a substantial portion of his assets to pay professional fees.
2 77
Time expenditure is another factor that exacerbates the cost
barrier for small U.K. firms, as is the situation for small U.S.
firms. 27s  Larger firms, such as Polly Peck,279 have a greater
ability to absorb the costs that accrue as a result of a lengthy
reorganization attempt. Thus, the trend has been for larger
corporations to employ the administration order procedure.28
While voluntary arrangements are less costly than adminis-
trations, they are not a solution to the cost barrier. Several
considerations push companies to obtain administration orders
instead of voluntary arrangements. The absence of a moratorium
will force companies to employ the costlier administration
procedure, which provides the necessary moratorium.21 In order
to obtain protection, companies will either employ the administra-
tion scheme in conjunction with voluntary arrangements or solely
employ the administration procedure. While the voluntary
arrangement procedure is less costly, the lack of a moratorium
renders it an unattractive choice for many small firms.
2. Recommendation
Several American commentators have suggested proposals
that address the difficulty in applying uniform reorganization
274. CAMPBELL, supra note 10, at 137.
275. Rajak, supra note 225, at 112.
276. Goldring, supra note 264, at 8.
277. See Cameron Markby Hewitt, Rescues of Distressed Companies: The Legal and
Practical Issues, in DEALING WITH FOREIGN WORKOUTS AND INSOLVENCIES 1993:
PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR LENDERS AND INVESTORS, at 141, 159 (PLI Com. Law &
Practice Course Handbook Series No. A-671, 1993). In a Chapter 11 proceeding, profes-
sional fees and the costs expended throughout the negotiation process contribute to the
higher operating costs. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 735. These professional fees
comprise a substantial portion of total bankruptcy costs. LoPucki, supra note 62, at 731
n.6.
278. LoPucki, supra note 62, at 756. Size insensitivity doubles the time necessary to
complete a reorganization. Id.
279. While Polly Peck was under an administration order, the company attracted
negative press comments about the attendant high costs. Hannigan, supra note 125, at
1040; see supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
280. CAMPBELL, supra note 10, at 137; French Shareholders v British Creditors,
ECONOMIST, Aug. 1, 1992, at 64.
281. See supra text accompanying note 221.
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procedures to both small and large corporate entities;2  these
proposals are also instructive in the context of small U.K. firms.
These commentators advocate a "context specific" approach,
rather than a "one size fits all" reorganization approach.83 The
tailoring of the current administration order procedure could
potentially solve the dilemma of small firms.
In the United States, members of Congress and commentators
have recommended various ways to improve Chapter 11. One
commentator argues that Chapter 11 should have two separate
chapters that deal with closely-held and non-closely-held corpora-
tions because the Bankruptcy Code does not distinguish between
the two types of firms.2' Another solution is the experimental
"Chapter 10," which applies to businesses that are indebted in the
amount of $2.5 million or less. 5 This chapter would streamline
some procedural requirements in an effort to avoid delay; thus,
this approach addresses the problems of time delay and costs
associated with reorganization.2' To illustrate, "Chapter 10"
would decrease the time delay in the following ways: (1) by
requiring debtors to file a plan, 45 days after filing the bankruptcy
petition; and (2) by requiring a confirmation hearing, 45 days after
filing the reorganization plan.8 Therefore, both Congress and
critics have recently engaged in substantial discussions about the
applicability of reorganization procedures to small firms.
In light of the U.S. proposals to improve reorganization
procedures for small firms, the United Kingdom should provide
separate provisions, in the administration order procedure, for
282. See generally Skeel, supra note 38 (suggesting the splitting of Chapter 11 into two
chapters); Tatelbaum, supra note 264 (describing a new "Chapter 10" for small firms).
Typically, smaller corporations do not succeed in formulating reorganization plans; thus,
they are converted into cases under Chapter 7. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 734.
283. See Skeel, supra note 38, at 510. LoPucki also endorses the concept of separate
treatment for small and large cases. LoPucki, supra note 62, at 757. See generally
Tatelbaum, supra note 264 (describing a new "Chapter 10" to address specifically small
companies).
284. Skeel, supra note 38, at 469. This approach is consistent with the prior system that
existed before the Bankruptcy Code of 1978. Skeel vigorously argues that Chapter 11 is
ineffective in its present state. See generally id.
285. S. 540, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); Hon. A. Thomas Small, Small Business
Bankruptcy Cases, 1993 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 305, 320. One bankruptcy judge has
informally implemented a system that is similar to the proposed "Chapter 10"; the judge
found that this system was effective. Tatelbaum, supra note 264, at 40.
286. See Small, supra note 285, at 320-21.
287. Id. at 320.
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small companies. To further simplify the process of obtaining an
administration order, some of the required hearings and proce-
dures could be combined together.' These changes could
greatly improve the efficiency of U.K. reorganization schemes for
small firms.
The incorporation of a moratorium into the voluntary arrange-
ment procedure is a solution that could transform the procedure
into a valuable insolvency option for small firms. The voluntary
arrangement procedure is a likely choice for small firms because
it is less cumbersome and less costly than the administration order
procedure. 289 Currently, firms obtain administration orders so
that they can avail themselves of the moratorium. The availability
of a moratorium will enable firms to obtain the voluntary arrange-
ment alone, without obtaining an administration order.
In light of the criticism of Chapter 11's size insensitivity, the
United Kingdom should also modify its reorganization schemes.
First, smaller firms are not easily able to use or afford the adminis-
tration order procedure. Second, while the voluntary arrangement
procedure offers advantageous features for small firms, its lack of
moratorium protection renders it an ineffective option. Thus, the
British Parliament must address these drawbacks in the administra-
tion order and voluntary arrangement procedures.
V. CONCLUSION
It is helpful to use Chapter 11 to analyze U.K. reorganization
because the two systems share some common policies and a
common origin. While Chapter 11 has considerably influenced the
recent U.K. Insolvency Act, the United Kingdom did not formu-
late its insolvency laws in conformity with the Chapter 11 model.
Judicial participation in the reorganization process is a fairly
new development in the United Kingdom; hence, previous and
upcoming cases have great precedential value. Therefore,
commentators and scholars have anxiously awaited the results of
the application of U.K. reorganization schemes.
288. This approach would be consistent with the concerns of the Review Committee.
"The Court procedure could be substantially streamlined and greatly improved. We
cannot believe that there is the need for quite so many applications to, or attendances on,
the Court." INSOLVENCY LAW AND PRAcrICE REPORT, supra note 16, at 101.
289. This suggestion is consistent with the initial concerns of the Review Committee.
Id.
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The current situation demands that Parliament consider
modifying aspects of the Insolvency Act in order to facilitate a
greater number of reorganizations. 29 The small number of firms
using the administration order and voluntary arrangement proce-
dures demonstrates the need for change. First, the voluntary
arrangement procedure must provide moratorium protection. This
change would encourage firms to seek reorganization, and would
enable the voluntary arrangement to become a more viable option
for firms that do not want to obtain administration orders.
Second, the United Kingdom should instate a procedure similar to
the Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession mechanism. Leaving incum-
bent management in place would encourage firms to seek
reorganization earlier, when rehabilitation is still possible. Lastly,
in order to accommodate small firms, U.K. reorganization schemes
must become more size sensitive.
Commentators criticize Chapter 11 for creating incentives that
encourage debtors to file for bankruptcy inappropriately; in
contrast, U.K. reorganization law must create more incentives that
encourage debtors to seek reorganization. The United Kingdom
has recognized the value of corporate reorganization, but it has not
gone far enough with its insolvency law to facilitate "corporate
rescues."
Alexandra Rhim*
290. Rajak, supra note 225, at 111.
* This Comment is dedicated to my parents. Special thanks for all the love and
support.
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